Constitutional Avoidance Step Zero by Vitarelli, Anthony
COMMENT
Constitutional Avoidance Step Zero
When construing ambiguous statutes, judges favor interpretations that do
not require the court to address a constitutional question-a long-standing
practice known as "constitutional avoidance" or the "avoidance canon."
Contrary to the common understanding of constitutional avoidance, this
Comment argues that employing the canon entails a more complicated process
than merely selecting the least constitutionally problematic statutory
interpretation. Rather, the avoidance canon first requires judges to engage in a
preliminary factual inquiry to determine whether a litigant's claim poses a risk
of requiring constitutional adjudication at all. Drawing from the administrative
law context, this Comment refers to that analysis as the Step Zero inquiry.' For
each of three paradigmatic statutory interpretation cases,2 the Comment
describes how the Court employs the avoidance canon only after reaching an
initial factual determination of constitutional doubt. Increased awareness of the
Step Zero avoidance inquiry may reduce instrumental judicial decisionmaking,
force deliberation among the judiciary to determine the appropriate Step Zero
threshold, and provide optimal incentives for litigants and Congress. This
Comment concludes by recommending additional avenues for scholarly
exploration on this topic.
1. This Comment uses the term "Step Zero" in a parallel manner as administrative law scholars
refer to the investigation that precedes Chevron analysis. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187 (2006). After United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2OO1), courts
conduct a "Step Zero" investigation as to whether Congress delegated rulemaldng authority
to agencies before applying Chevron analysis. This Comment employs Step Zero as a term of
art, implying that courts are currently applying a structurally (but not substantively) similar
preliminary investigation before applying the avoidance canon.
2. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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I. MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND ITS PROCEDURAL
AMBIGUITY
The Supreme Court articulated the modern avoidance canon through its
assertion in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &
Construction Trades Council that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of
a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe
the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress." 3 Although a detailed exposition of the history and
recent treatment of the avoidance canon exceeds the scope of this Comment,4 it
is worth noting that scholars have begun to characterize many cases-
ostensibly decided without using the avoidance canon-as cases in which the
avoidance canon operated as a background norm that influenced the
disposition.' Because of this shift in scholarly understanding, examining the
avoidance canon's Step Zero has far more relevance than for only those cases in
which the court explicitly employs that canon of construction.
The Step Zero avoidance inquiry is as old as the canon itself. Indeed, the
judicial practice of avoiding constitutional questions pre-dates even judicial
review; it was arguably first espoused in the 18oo case Mossman v. Higginson.6
Despite being such a deeply engrained, relatively uncontroversial judicial
procedure,7 this Comment asserts that constitutional avoidance contains a
nebulous, previously unexamined threshold inquiry. Although some scholars
have hinted at the vagueness of the procedure-Judge Richard Posner has
referred to the ambiguity of the avoidance canon as a "judge-made
3. 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Adrian Vermeule also identifies "classical avoidance" as a discrete
form of the canon. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948 (1997).
He draws classical avoidance from Justice Holmes's quote in Blodgett v. Holden: "[A]s
between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, [a court's] plain duty is to adopt that which will
save the Act." 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
4. For a more detailed discussion of the avoidance canon, see RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 2.13(g) (4 th ed.
2009).
S. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1561 (2000) (characterizing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651 (1996), as an avoidance case).
6. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (18oo); Vermeule, supra note 3, at 1948 (arguing that avoidance pre-dates
judicial review); cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial
review).
7. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SuPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLrTCS 18o-83 (2d ed. 1962).
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constitutional 'penumbra"' - no scholar has recognized this fact-intensive
examination. 8 Professor Trevor Morrison, for instance, elided the core issue
simply by quoting the relevant language from Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. as
identifying when the canon is "trigger[ed]." 9 The next Part isolates this inquiry
and explores three cases.
II. STEP ZERO IN PRACTICE
The three statutory interpretation cases discussed in this Part demonstrate
how the Step Zero avoidance investigation exists across jurisprudentially
dissimilar cases. For the following reasons, these cases serve as compelling
examples for this examination. First, each case may be understood as
employing the avoidance canon, even if the authors of each opinion do not
explicitly premise their arguments on avoidance principles. Second, each
opinion contains an acknowledgment that a factual inquiry precedes
application of avoidance: the Step Zero inquiry. Third, the six opinions-each
case's majority and accompanying opinions -include a range of six possible
threshold levels for the Step Zero process. That is, each opinion identifies a
different level of constitutional doubt to trigger use of the avoidance canon.
To begin, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago presents the only unequivocal
example of constitutional avoidance and, accordingly, provides the most
succinct and vivid Step Zero exposition. Before construing the statute, the
majority examines the practical implications of NLRB's involvement in
religiously affiliated schools. The Court concludes that "intrusion into this area
could run afoul of the Religion Clauses ... [and] we would be required to
decide whether that was constitutionally permissible."' 0 After surpassing this
Step Zero threshold of potentially requiring a constitutional decision, the
Court proceeds to construe the statute in light of the avoidance canon. In
contrast, dissenting in NLRB, Justice Brennan adheres to the standard of
requiring a "serious doubt of constitutionality" before employing avoidance."
Such a standard requires a weightier determination -that of serious doubt-as
opposed to the majority's view that any interpretation that merely could be
problematic triggers the canon.
8. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 8oo, 816 (1983).
9. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 1o6 COLUM. L. REV.
1189, 1203 (2006).
io. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 44o U.S. 490, 499 (1979) (emphasis added).
n. Id. at 51o (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961)).
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The second case, Gregory v. Ashcroft, is a less obvious example of
avoidance."2 Whereas NLRB stands as one of the Court's most explicit uses of
the avoidance canon, 3 scholars commonly cite Gregory as a federalism case. 14
Nonetheless, a strong argument exists to view Gregory as an avoidance case
because of the constitutional principles that animate the Court's concern about
the balance between the national government and state governments. Also, in
resolving the case, Justice O'Connor conducts a robust Step Zero investigation
before ever examining either the statute's text or congressional intent. After
reviewing the exhaustive history of shared powers, the Court concludes that
finding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applicable to
Missouri judges "would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and
state powers."'" Having concluded that a constitutional question exists, the
majority proceeds to statutory construction in light of the constitutional issue.
Justice White's concurrence in Gregory lends additional support to the
theory that a Step Zero inquiry precedes avoidance analyses and profoundly
impacts the manner in which the Court interprets statutes. Performing a
similarly sequenced investigation as the majority, Justice White concludes,
first, that no constitutional difficulty exists and, second, that the Court should
interpret the ADEA using ordinary canons of construction.'6 Justice White's
Step Zero conclusion that the Gregory dispute involved no constitutional
question compels him to dispose of the case without the avoidance norms that
precipitate the majority's disposition.
Finally, like Gregory, scholarly treatments of Gonzales v. Oregon have not
commonly regarded it as an avoidance case. 7 This Comment asserts, however,
that the Gonzales opinion's attempt to resolve the case by avoiding
constitutional decisionmaking contains a clear exposition of the Step Zero
inquiry. Unlike Gregory's open discussion of constitutional issues, Gonzales
presents a more implicit example of avoidance. To view Gonzales as such
requires contextualizing it within the Court's assisted suicide jurisprudence.
Considering Gonzales and its predecessor physician-assisted suicide case,
12. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
13. See Robert W. Scheef, Temporal Dynamics in Statutory Interpretation: Courts, Congress, and the
Canon of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 U. PiTT. L. REV. 529, 542 (2003) (describing NLRB as
the "high watermark" of avoidance).
14. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959, 986 (2007).
15. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
16. Id. at 474 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. See, e.g., Ann Graham, Searchingfor Chevron in Muddy Waters: The Roberts Court and Judicial
Review of Agency Regulations, 6o ADMIN. L. REv. 229, 240-43 (2008).
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Washington v. Glucksberg,"8 as a coherent whole, the Step Zero analysis and
influence of avoidance norms conform distinctly to the more structured inquiry
present in NLRB and Gregory.
The Glucksberg Court conducted a fact-intensive investigation into the
constitutional challenges presented by physician-assisted suicide and satisfied
the Step Zero avoidance investigation. 9 Foundational in Justice Kennedy's
Gonzales opinion is the Glucksberg Step Zero conclusion that wholesale
prohibition of physician-assisted suicide at least implicates constitutional
uncertainty.2" Having proceeded from Step Zero, the majority applies
avoidance norms consonant with those present in NLRB and Gregory. The
majority writes without elaboration that "Glucksberg . . .makes the .. .
delegation [to the Attorney General] all the more suspect."21 Furthermore, the
"earnest and profound debate" among the citizenry cannot alone be significant
enough to alter a strong deference norm;22 rather, the majority awards the
Attorney General less deference because to do otherwise would advance upon
the frontier of constitutionality prohibited by avoidance. Justice Scalia's
Gonzales dissent parallels Justice White's concurrence in Gregory, creating an
additional link within this set of cases. Reaching the conclusion that the case
presents no constitutional question, Justice Scalia construes the Controlled
Substances Act using the same ordinary canons of construction guiding Justice
White's construction of the ADEA in Gregory. 3
Despite their uniform engagement in preliminary constitutional
examination, the three cases diverge on the threshold level of constitutional
doubt that warrants use of the avoidance canon. The six principal opinions
establish a spectrum from highest to lowest level of Step Zero scrutiny. Justice
Kennedy establishes the lowest threshold for invoking avoidance norms, as
Gonzales merely involved an unsettled constitutional issue in the eyes of the
public. The NLRB majority claims to meet the Step Zero threshold if the facts
"could run afoul" of constitutional guarantees.' In Gregory, Justice O'Connor
found the potential interpretation would "upset the usual constitutional
balance."2" Justice Brennan, in his NLRB dissent, embraces the standard of
18. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
19. See id. at 722-36.
2o. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267-68 (2006).
21. Id. at 267.
22. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. See id. at 275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490,499 (1979).
2s. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
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"serious doubt of constitutionality. "1126 Justice White dissents in Gregory and
demands a higher standard than merely a "potential constitutional problem." 27
Establishing the highest bar, Justice Scalia, in his Gonzales dissent, elects not to
apply avoidance because the facts do not "push the outer limits" of
constitutional protection.2 No temporal trend exists in the level of scrutiny:
the most recent opinion presents the most polarized standards in majority and
dissent.29
Although each Justice presents this inquiry in varying degrees of
extensiveness, no opinion identifies this process as anything more than
background information before the primary task of interpretation. Each
ostensibly structures its inquiry by first ascertaining whether a plausible
reading of the statute exists that avoids the constitutional issue. The use of the
avoidance canon is assumed. Although each identifies either textual analysis or
construing legislative history as its primary assignment, the Step Zero
determination establishes the context for those exercises. It has transpired in
advance of this interpretive step. Because this process operates before the
purported first step in so many critical cases of statutory interpretation, the
next Part discusses the specific benefits of an unambiguous and uniform Step
Zero standard.
III.THE IMPORTANCE OF STEP ZERO
Courts should openly acknowledge the Step Zero inquiry and should
enunciate an explicit standard for future cases. Such a standard will confer four
primary benefits to the legal system: (i) judges will be less likely to adjudicate
cases instrumentally through their use of the avoidance canon; (2) litigants will
perceive more accurately the consequences of potential litigation; (3) the
determination of the appropriate Step Zero level will compel a fruitful
deliberative process within the judiciary that may clarify other areas of
uncertainty; and (4) having a settled Step Zero threshold will ensure that
Congress, when drafting legislation, has more complete knowledge of how
courts will interpret statutes.
26. 44o U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50
(1961)).
27. 501 U.S. at 479 (White, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the majority's standard).
a8. 546 U.S. at 291 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One might also argue that Justice Scalia sets an even
higher standard with his citation to United States v. Sullivan for the proposition that "courts
shall not distort... congressional purpose, not even if the dearly correct purpose... leads
inevitably to a holding of constitutional invalidity." 332 U.S. 689, 693 (1948).
2g. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267; id. at 291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A clear Step Zero inquiry may allay criticisms relating to judicial
instrumentalism. If judges must engage with a specified level of constitutional
doubt, they will be compelled to enumerate clearly their reasons for applying
the avoidance canon in a particular case. Assuming for the purpose of
argument that the vast empirical evidence of legal realists has salience,3"
techniques that would reduce unprincipled or political decisionmaking should
improve the reliability and predictability of adjudication. This
acknowledgement of the "New Legal Realism"'" may be extended to clarify
each stage of judicial decisionmaking, minimizing attitudinal biases.32 The
identification and settling of the Step Zero inquiry, therefore, is a further step
in the direction toward neutral decisionmaking.
Moreover, acknowledging the existence of a discrete judicial decision point
will provide the appropriate incentives for litigants to make the case more
persuasively to courts that the judiciary should or should not engage in
constitutional avoidance analysis. Litigants may presently argue that the
avoidance inquiry compels a specified result, but insufficient attention is paid
to whether that analysis should apply at all. If the court selects a consensus
threshold as to the level of constitutional doubt required before the canon
should apply, litigants will be able to tailor their arguments toward that
standard and will have clearer notice that the canon may not apply in
unambiguous circumstances.3" Because "[l]itigation occurs only when parties
either cannot or do not predict what the court will do," this development
advances judicial economy and efficient decisionmaking. 34
An understanding that forces courts to contend with competing
constitutional understandings that might require avoidance will initiate a
dialogic process within the courts to precipitate the appropriate standard. One
can envision conservative judges articulating an exacting standard to defer in
greater measure to democratically accountable legislatures, whereas more
30. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, T-iE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED (2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real
World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008); Eric A. Posner, Does Political
Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional
Reform, 7 5 U. CHI. L. REv. 853 (2008).
31. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 831 (2oo8).
32. See generally Posner, supra note 30 (describing efforts to mitigate bias).
33. See Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 323 (2005); Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE
L.J. 676 (2007).
34. Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant?: An Empirical Analysis ofJapan's
Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 34 (2006).
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liberal judges might espouse a flexible standard to permit courts to reach
outcomes that reflect legislative purpose in cases of statutory ambiguity."5 This
debate, however, does not necessarily result in an outcome along a one-
dimensional threshold spectrum from high to low. Courts might consider the
manner in which the statute in question had been enacted, whether there had
been other indicia of constitutional doubt, or whether it raises constitutional
questions arising from multiple clauses of the Constitution.
Finally, courts should adopt a consistent standard for utilizing avoidance to
provide ideal incentives for Congress when drafting potentially problematic
statutes. An unambiguous threshold for employing the canon will give
complete information to legislatures about the likelihood that courts will
invalidate a statute because of constitutional doubt. 6 A clear standard will have
a deliberation-forcing effect on Congress, as representatives will be more likely
to embrace an objective standard as a policy consideration. That is, once the
court has delineated a standard for avoidance, legislators will debate this issue
explicitly and may avoid enacting problematic statutes.
The ultimate identification of the Step Zero inquiry may have profound
effects on litigation involving constitutionally suspect statutes. Courts will be
decreasingly likely to decide these claims in an instrumental fashion; litigants
will have the optimal incentives for casting their arguments; courts will engage
in a reasoned process of common-law-making to select the appropriate
threshold; and Congress may be more deliberate in its legislative drafting. Each
of these changes signifies a marked improvement from the status quo,
advances judicial economy, and promotes reasoned decisionmaking through
neutral principles of adjudication. The appropriate threshold to be selected
remains a subject that demands significant scholarly attention. The next Part
intends to identify the most productive avenues of scholarship through which
the academy might attempt to influence courts in making that determination.
IV. CONCLUSION: AVENUES OF EXPLORATION
This Comment has intended to demonstrate the existence of a preliminary
factual determination that occurs in advance of employing the avoidance
canon. It concludes by outlining a potential research agenda that will assist
35. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
25 (1998), with STEPHEN BREYER, AcTivE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOcRATIc
CONSTITUTION 17-18 (2005).
36. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 36-38 (2008).
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courts in determining the appropriate threshold to select as the Step Zero
avoidance inquiry. At its core, courts must resolve this question by determining
a standard above which the avoidance canon will be triggered. Though
subjective, courts will ideally select a standard that is sufficiently detailed to
alleviate concerns of indeterminacy and judicial manipulation -precisely the
concerns that counsel in favor of creating a standard from the current
ambiguity.
Scholars should evaluate the bounds of that potential standard by assessing
the viability of the polar standards offered by Justice Kennedy and Justice
Scalia in Gonzales.37 Concluding decisively that the appropriate standard lies
between two poles will signify a strong first step toward developing a coherent
discussion of this issue. Specifically, scholars should begin by considering the
effect on statutory claims that would arise from adopting Justice Kennedy's
implied standard of utilizing the canon in cases of potential constitutional
uncertainty. One can envision an exhaustive treatment of statutory claims in
which litigants characterize their arguments as being implicated by various
areas of unsettled constitutional law subject to "earnest and profound
debate.", 8 At the other extreme, scholars should assess whether Justice Scalia's
standard-when a statute "push[es] the outer limits" of constitutional
protection-overly limits the judiciary.39 His reasoning builds upon two cases,
Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers40 and United States v.
Sullivan,4 in which the Court elected not to employ avoidance when
construing the Commerce Clause power. Such a standard may unnecessarily
constrain courts in engaging with foundational constitutional questions.
If scholars and judges conclude that the range of available options, indeed,
lies between those two poles, they should then shift their attention toward
assessing whether any of the four other standards enumerated in this
Comment offer courts the optimal threshold for achieving the goals outlined in
Part III. This Comment urges them to consider whether the selected standard
balances the interests of litigant incentives, legislative clarity, and avoidance of
unnecessary constitutionalizing of statutory claims. Regardless of the ultimate
standard selected, the act of explicitly enumerating any standard at all will go
37. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267-68 (2006); id. at 291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) ("Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the
outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that
result.").
41. 332 U.S. 689, 697-98 (1948).
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far toward realizing Justice Brandeis's famous statement that "[i]t is usually
more important that a rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right."42
ANTHONY VITARELLI
42. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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